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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KARYL I. McKEAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS M. McKEAN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
CASE NO. 13954 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff-Appellant, Karyl I. McKean, appeals 
from the Decree of Divorce entered against her in the Third 
Judicial District Court and from the denial of her Motion 
to Alter or Amend Judgment, or In The Alternative For A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
New Trial in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court found grounds for divorce pursuant to 
Section 30-3-1, U„C.A* (1953), as amended, and entered a 
Decree of Divorce against both the Defendant-Respondent 
and the Plaintiff-Appellant. Subsequently the Plaintiff-
Appellant filed a Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment, or 
In The Alternative, For A New Trial, which Motion was denied, 
except for minor modifications that were made in the Decree. 
(TR. 73-74). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the Decree 
of Divorce granted Defendant-Respondent and a new trial to 
determine an equitable property settlement and sufficient 
payment of alimony, child support and attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Respondent are 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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husband and wife, having been married at Salt Lake City, 
State of Utah on April 3, 1948. (TR. 27) . There are six 
children born of the marriage, two of which are dependent 
children, living at home: Scott T. McKean, age 19, born 
December 15, 1955 and Sara Liza McKean, age 9, born August 
5, 1965 (Trial Trans. 27). The Defendant is presently 
employed as Sales Manager for a heavy construction equip-
ment sales firm (Trial Trans. 113). 
After 26 years of marriage, Plaintiff filed for divorce 
on June 11, 1973 and Defendant answered and counterclaimed 
on July 9, 1973. Defendant alleged in his counterclaim 
that Plaintiff had treated him cruelly, causing him great 
mental suffering and distress (TR. 27). 
On November 18, 1974, a Decree of Divorce was entered, 
granting both Plaintiff and Defendant a divorce. Plaintiff 
was awarded the care and custody of the minor dependent 
children, subject to the reasonable visitation rights of 
Defendant (TR. 51). Plaintiff was further awarded: (1) 
the use of the home of the parties, subject to all liens 
and taxes; (2) one-half of the equity of said home, which 
has been ordered to be sold upon Plaintiff's remarriage, or 
upon Plaintiff's removal from said home, or upon the last 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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minor child attaining an age of majority; (3) one-half of 
all Defendant's future bonuses, if any, less any Federal 
and State withholding and FICA deductions; (4) one-half of 
the savings of the parties, in the amount of $2,071.50; 
(5) one-half of Defendant's 1974 bonus in the amount of 
$1,337.00; (6) the 1964 Ford station wagon (subject to use 
by the son, Scott) and the 1972 Ford Truck and camper; (7) 
automotive tools; (8) some household furniture, personal 
effects and clothing; (9) alimony in the amount of $300.00 
per month; (10) child support in the amount of $150.00 per 
child per month. Plaintiff was ordered to pay her own 
attorney's fees and the BankAmericard obligation. (TR. 51-
The Divorce Decree awarded Defendant: (1) one-half 
of the equity of the home when sold; (2) one-half of Defen-
dant's future bonuses, if any; (3) one-half of the savings 
of the parties, in the amount of $2,071.50; (4) some house-
hold furniture and appliances; (5) personal effects, cloth-
ing, television set, rifle, workbench, movie camera and 
projector; (6) carpentry tools, including bench saw; (7) 
retirement fund of $20,615,00; (8) insurance policies with 
cash surrender values totaling $4,675.44. (TR. 51-55). 
Defendant was found to be earning a net income of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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approximately $1,200.00 per month after Federal and State 
tax withholding, FICA Retirement, and Medical Insurance 
deductions. This amount of monthly income did not reflect 
any actual or potential bonuses that Defendant would receive. 
(Trial Trans. 156). 
Plaintiff has suffered a hand and wrist injury which 
has resulted in permanent partial disability (Trial Trans. 
30). Plaintiff is unemployed and unskilled, having devoted 
her 26 years of marriage to being a wife and a mother. Her 
only employment was as a secretary during the first two years 
of marriage and as an Avon representative for approximately 
three years (Trial Trans. 28). The disability in Plain-
tiff's hand and wrist interfers with her ability to type 
(Trial Trans. 30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING OF FACTS 
TO SUPPORT A DECREE OF DIVORCE IN FAVOR OF DEFEN-
DANT-RESPONDENT. 
Defendant sought and was granted a divorce decree 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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pursuant to Section 30-3-1(7) U.C.A. (1953), as amended, 
which sets out as one of the grounds for divorce: "Cruel 
treatment of the Plaintiff by the Defendant to the extent 
of causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the 
Plaintiff." The Findings of Fact state in paragraph 4 that 
[d]uring the marriage the Plaintiff has treated the Defen-
dant cruelly, upsetting him in arguments and fights and 
refusing to perform her marriage duties as a wife, which 
has caused him to be nervous and upset and distressed." 
(TR. 61). Testimony was elicited from the Defendant to 
support the allegation that Plaintiff refused to perform 
her marriage duties (Trial Trans. 115-116). Said testimony 
was later effectively rebutted by the Plaintiff (Trial 
Trans. 165, 170-171). There was no testimony elicited from 
Defendant to show that Plaintiff!s alleged denial of sexual 
relations with Defendant caused Defendant any emotional 
distress at all or caused Defendant "to be nervous and upset 
and distressed," as found by the Court (TR. 61). 
There is no testimony or evidence in the record to 
support the Findings of Fact that Plaintiff upset Defendant 
in arguments and fights. Defendant did testify that "it 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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had been a rather rocky marriage," but such testimony is 
vague and does not warrant a finding by the Court that 
Plaintiff upset Defendant in arguments and fights causing 
him to be nervous and upset (Trial Trans. 115, line 5). 
Courts are not authorized to grant divorces except 
for particular cause prescribed by law and then only when 
grounds or cause for divorce are proved by substantial and 
satisfactory evidence. Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 
212 P. 2d 194 (1949). There was neither substantial nor 
satisfactory evidence to support Finding No. 4 (TR. 61). 
Furthermore, the lower court in its Findings of Fact 
3 and 4 found that each party denied sexual relations to 
the other party, thus causing great mental distress to each 
other. If, in fact, each party intentionally refused to 
have marital relations with the other, then each party was 
the cause of his or her own mental distress resulting from 
any such denials, and said mental distress cannot possibly 
be blamed on the other. Findings 3 and 4 are in logical 
conflict with each other. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
AWARDED PLAINTIFF. 
The trial court awarded Plaintiff the sum of Three 
Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month as alimony and One 
Hundred Fifty Dollars($150.00) per month per dependent 
child. (TR. 55). Plaintiff was also awarded one-half of 
all future bonuses of Defendant subject to deductions for 
taxes and social security. (TR. 52). However, Defendant's 
bonuses are not guaranteed in amount or payment and are 
dependent either upon the discretion of the employer of 
Defendant, or upon the Defendant attaining a certain sales 
goal in his department (TR. 122-123). Effectively, all 
that Plaintiff can rely on getting is the alimony and child 
support mentioned above. 
It was found by the Court that Defendant has a net 
earning of approximately $1,200.00 per month. It would 
appear that in paying Plaintiff Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) 
per month in alimony and child support, Defendant would 
be equally dividing his net income between himself and 
Plaintiff. However, the $600.00 he would net is after 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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taxes, social security, retirement and medical insurance, 
and would be subject to a tax refund because of the $3,600.00 
yearly tax deduction he would have for payment of alimony. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff's receipt of $3,600.00 per year in 
alimony is before taxes, medical insurance and any savings 
for later years, and hence will net her far less in net 
income than the gross amount of $3,600.00. Also, the lower 
court took into account Defendant's total yearly payment 
of Social Security for purposes of determining Defendant's 
net pay (Trial Trans. 121-122). His net pay was used as 
a basis for determining the award of alimony and child 
support to Plaintiff. In the Decree, Plaintiff was awarded 
one-half of all future bonuses subject to State and Fed-
eral withholding tax and social security deductions. The 
social security deduction from his 1974 bonus was shown to 
be substantial (Trial Trans. 156), to such an extent that 
his social security was paid up by mid-year in 1974 (Trial 
Trans. 155). Hence, on the one hand, Defendant was allowed 
to deduct his full yearly payment of social security in de-
termining his net take-home pay for purposes of showing the 
sum from which alimony and child support payments could be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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made* On the other hand, Defendant was also allowed a 
credit for social security taken out of all future bonuses, 
in spite of a showing that a significant amount of his 
yearly social security was taken from his bonus rather than 
his periodic pay checks throughout the entire year. In 
other words, Defendant received more credit for his social 
security than he should have. 
The lower court clearly abused its discretion by re-
quiring Plaintiff to maintain herself and her two dependent 
children on less than Defendant is awarded to maintain 
himself, a single man. 
; In Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 PU 292 (1928), 
The allocation to the wife was held to be inequitable and 
unjust in view of property owned by the husband and the 
cause was remanded with instructions to modify the decree. 
Such is the case in this instance. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN ITS DIVISION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY. 
An equitable division of the marital property would 
be an award of 50% of the jointly owned property to each 
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of the parties. The lower court appears to have followed 
this formula in dividing most of the marital property in 
this case. However, the lower court failed to award Plain-
tiff any interest in Defendant's retirement fund, which 
had a vested interest of $20,615.00 as of March 31, 1974. 
This retirement fund was accumulated over the years of the 
marriage and should have been considered as marital pro-
perty in making a division of the total property of the 
parties. An equitable solution would have been to award 
Defendant the entire vested interest in the Retirement 
Fund and award Plaintiff something of equivalent value, 
such as the one-half of the equity in the home of the par-
ties, which was awarded to Defendant. This solution would 
have also eliminated (1) the necessity for Plaintiff to 
leave her home in nine years, when her youngest child 
reached the age of majority, and (2) the necessity for her 
to seek a new life elsewhere at a substantially and unjus-
tifiably lower standard of living due to the fact that she 
would not be able to afford a home such as she is presently 
living in because she would receive only one-half of the 
equity in the present home at the time of sale. 
Furthermore, Defendant was ordered by the Court to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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refrain from spending any income received above and beyond 
his salary during the pendency of the divorce action (TR. • 
p. 36). Defendant testified that he spent his Christmas 
bonus in violation of the court Order (Trial Trans. 141). 
No provision was made in the Decree for the splitting of 
that bonus between the parties as was done in the case of 
all other funds except the Retirement Fund. 
The decree of the lower court was reversed in Stewart 
v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242 Pac. 947 (1925), on the ground 
that the division of the property as made by the trial 
court was "clearly inequitable and unfair." 
POINT IV. . 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN ITS FAILURE TO AWARD PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY : : 
FEES. 
The Plaintiff is partially disabled, unemployed and 
unskilled, having spent her 26 years of married life as a 
housewife and a mother. In the property settlement, as it 
now stands, the only liquid assets awarded to Plaintiff were 
a share of the family savings, in the amount of $2,071.50, 
and a share of Defendant's 1974 bonus, in the amount of 
$1,337.00, which provides Plaintiff with the only security she will 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1J 
have against emergency expenses which are an everyday part 
of life. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3 
Utah 2d 82, 278 P. 2d 983 (1955) stated that "...where it 
appears that the husband is better able to bear the costs 
of the divorce, and no gross or immoral conduct has been 
proved against the defendant, the wife although the losing 
party, should be allowed suit money." Id. at P. 85. 
Furthermore, the Court in Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 
Utah 504, 229 P. 2d 681 (1951) explained that "[t]he reason 
for permitting a wife suit money to defend an action for 
divorce rests on the ground that the wife normally has no 
separate estate from which to pay for bringing or defend-
ing the action...Not to allow the wife expenses and counsel 
fees would in the majority of cases work an injustice by 
denying her the power to enforce any marital rights she 
may have." Id. at pp. 686-687. 
In the case at hand, there was no showing of gross or 
immoral conduct on the part of the Plaintiff. The defen-
dant was clearly shown to be the party better able to 
bear the costs of the divorce since he was gainfully em-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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14 
ployed at a good paying job and she was unemployed. Further-
more/ her net liquid "estate" from the divorce was of such 
a small size by today's standards that to require the 
Plaintiff to pay her own attorney's fees, in the amount of 
$796.00/ would be to substantially reduce that already 
small estate, and hence to all but eliminate Plaintiff's 
security and ability to handle emergency expenses. 
POINT V. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT/ OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
The various grounds for Plaintiff's Motion To Alter 
or Amend Judgment/ or in the Alternative, For a New Trial 
are included within the matters heretofore argued in this 
Brief and are fully set out in the Trial Record on page 
57. The errors of the trial court were such as to require 
a new trial to hear the issues. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above arguments, the lower court erred: 
(1) in granting Defendant a Decree of Divorce; (2) in its 
division of the marital property; (3) in its award of 
inadequate alimony and child support; (4) in its failure 
to award Plaintiff her attorneys fees and; (5) in its 
failure to grant Plaintiff a new trial upon her motion. 
Hence, Plaintiff should be granted a new trial to deter-
mine an equitable solution to these errors. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE A. EASTER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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